

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
NORTHERN DIVISION

JUAN CARLOS CRUZ,	)	
	)	
Petitioner,	)	
	)	
v.	)	CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:05-CV-877-F
	)	[WO]
	)	
SCOTT MIDDLEBROOKS,	)	
	)	
Respondent.	)	

**RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

In this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 action, Juan Carlos Cruz [“Cruz”], a federal inmate, filed a motion for injunctive relief under Rule 65, *Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*. The court construes this document as a motion preliminary injunction. Upon consideration of the motion for preliminary injunction, the court concludes that this motion is due to be denied.

**DISCUSSION**

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound discretion of the district court . . .” *Palmer v. Braun*, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002). The four prerequisites which Cruz must demonstrate are: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) that the harm to Cruz outweighs the harm to the non-moving parties; and (4) that an injunction would be in the interest of the public. *Palmer*, 287 F.3d at 1329; *Cate v. Oldham*, 707 F.2d 1176 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp.*, 697 F.2d 1352 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983). “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless

the movant clearly established the burden of persuasion” as to each of the four prerequisites. *See McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson*, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted); *see also Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A.*, 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1975) (grant of preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule,” and movant must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party’s failure to demonstrate a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits” may defeat the party’s claim, regardless of the party’s ability to establish any of the other elements. *Church v. City of Huntsville*, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994); *see also Siegel v. Lepore*, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000) (noting that “the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper”).

Cruz only makes the conclusory assertion that he will suffer irreparable harm absent issuance of the preliminary injunction. *Motion for Preliminary Injunction - Court Doc. No. 2* at 2-3. He also merely acknowledges existence of the requirement that he “show a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation . . .” *Id.* at 3. Thus, the motion only briefly references the questions of irreparable harm and likelihood of success and does not address balancing the equities of the parties or whether the issuance of an injunction would be in the public interest. The pleadings before the court therefore fail to establish that Cruz meets each of the prerequisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

### **CONCLUSION**

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction be denied. It is further

ORDERED that on or before September 28, 2005 the parties shall file objections to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. *Nettles v. Wainwright*, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See *Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc.*, 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also *Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 15<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2005.

**/s/ Delores R. Boyd**  
DELORES R. BOYD  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE